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CONTROL OF PROPERTY BY THE DEAD. IL.*
PURPOSES OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY.
Now, whether the device of a condition or of a trust is
employed, it is clear that one has no right to dispose of his prop-
erty in a manner which is not merely capricious, but which is
also positively detrimental to society; which is, in other words,
against public policy. _The right of the individual to dispose of
his property as he likes is subordinate to the right of the com-
munity to insist that property shall not be devoted to a purpose
inimical to its interests, and that property shall not be used indi-
rectly as an instrument to compel or induce the accomplishment
of such a purpose. If an attempt is made to create a trust for
such a purpose the trust fails. If a gift is conditioned upon the
accomplishment of such a purpose either the gift fails or it is
absolute."' Now let us consider what purposes are condemned
as illegal.
I. In the first place, a disposition is clearly illegal when
thereby property is to be used in accomplishing purposes which
are criminal. A bequest to trustees for Stevenson's Suicide Club
would certainly be illegal. So also is a bequest to trustees "to
make seats for poor people to beg in by the highways," when such
begging is illegal.7 2  So, too, a provision is illegal if its direct
and natural tendency is to induce the commission of criminal
acts.
* Continued from the April issue, 65 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
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"' In the case of a devise of land upon an illegal condition, if the con-
dition is precedent, the whole gift is void; if the condition is subsequent,
the condition is void and the gift is absolute; as to personalty the courts
in England have held that a condition precedent which is illegal as involving
malum prohibilum is void and that the gift is absolute. Whether the
American courts will follow the English decisions and treat conditions
precedent as void or will follow the rule as to lana and treat the gift
as void, is still uncertain, although the tendency is to follow the English
doctrine. See Pound, Legacies on Impossible or Illegal Conditions Prece-
dent, 3 Il. L. Rev. I, criticizing the English cases.
"2 Duke, Law of Charitable Uses, 133.
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"If lands be given or granted to a man, upon condition that
he shall kill a man, or upon condition that he shall burn his neigh-
bor's house, or upon condition that he shall forswear himself, or
upon condition that he shall save and keep harmless the grantor
whatsoever he shall do, or that if he do not these things [i. e.,
things contrary to law] the grant shall be void, this condition is
void." 7s
A bequest to purchase the release of persons committed to
prison for non-payment of fines under the game laws is illegal,
because it directly tends to encourage a violation of those laws. 4
The mere fact, however, that a disposition has a slight tendency
to induce an unlawful act will .not invalidate the disposition.
Thus if property is given to one for life with a remainder to
another, the latter while awaiting the termination of the life
estate might in a moment of impatience feel tempted not to await
the course of nature; but the tendency to induce him to commit
murder is slight enough to be disregarded.
II. A disposition is illegal if it tends to interfere with a
function of the state. A condition divesting the interest of a
devisee if he enters into the naval or military service of the coun-
try is clearly against public policy.7 5 In England, indeed, a con-
dition divesting a great estate if the devisee should not acquire a
peerage has been held by the House of Lords in a famous case
to be void as against public policy.7 16 But it is very doubtful
whether this case is rightly decided. The judges whose opinions
were asked for by the lords were almost unanimously in favor
of the validity of the condition, feeling that the tendency to
"Sheppard's Touchstone, 132. See also Co. Lit. 2o6a.
" Thrupp v. Collett, 26 Beav. 125.
"In re Beard (i9o8), i Ch. 383. In Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De G. &
Sim. 467, a trust for the political restoration of the Jews to Jerusalem was
held invalid as tending to cause a revolution in a friendly country. In Hutch-
ins v. George, 44 N. J. Eq. 124, a trust for the purpose of distributing the
writings of Henry George was held illegal because in "Progress and Poverty"
the writer teaches that "historically, as ethically, private property in land
is robbery." Fortunately the decision was overruled in George v. Braddock,
45 N. J. Eq. 757.
"Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. i. And so trust to procure a peer-
age was held invalid. Kingston v. Pierepont, I Vern. 5. But a con-
dition divesting an estate if the devisee should succeed to a peerage is
valid. Caithness v. Sinclair (1912), S. C. 79.
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induce the employment of improper means in acquiring a title
was so slight as to be disregarded. But the lords feared for the
dignity of their order.
III. So, too, a disposition vill not be upheld if it tends to
encourage immorality. It is on this ground that bequests to
illegitimate children conceived after the testator's death are held
invalid.
77
IV. So, too, a disposition may be against public policy on
the ground that it tends to the disruption of the family. A dis-
position is illegal if it improperly tends to induce the separation
or divorce of husband and wife.78 But the rather sweeping and
undiscriminating attitude of the earlier law in attempting to
keep the family together at all hazards is becoming gradually
modified. The law still condemns a breach of conjugal obliga-
tions; it still condemns an unjustifiable divorce or separation;
and a condition attached to a legacy which clearly tends to induce
a divorce without proper cause, or a separation without justifica-
tion, is illegal.7 9 But a justifiable divorce or separation of hus-
band and wife is not condemned. A testamentary gift to a
married woman during such time as her husband should live
apart from her is not invalid, when at the time of the making
of the will the legatee had already been deserted by her hus-
band, and the purpose of the provision was to provide for her
until he should come back to her.80  It has been held recently
that a condition attached to a legacy that the legacy shall be
payable upon the death of the wife of the legatee or upon his
divorce or separation from her is not against public policy, for
it will be presumed that the testator did not mean an improper
divorce or separation."'
"Crook v. Hill, 3 Ch. D. 773; Godefroi, Trusts (4th Ed.), 191; Jarman,
Wills, 1771. It was formerly held that bequests to. illegitimate children
conceived after the execution of the will, but before the death of the
testator, were invalid, but this is not now law. Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R.
9 Ch. App. 147; In the Estate of Frogley, [i9o5], P. 137.
78It re Moore, 39 Ch. D. r16; 6 Gray, Cases on Property (2d Ed.), 6-:26.
"' Wilkinson V. Wilkinson, L. R. 12 Eq. 604.
' In re Charleton, 55 Sol. J., 330; Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich.
6oi; Paider v. Suchy, 159 N. Y. App. Div. 230.
11 Daboll v. Moon, 88 Conn. 387.
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So, too, a disposition of property which tends to induce a
parent not to perform his duty to his child is illegal. Thus a
provision that property given to a parent is to be forfeited if
he lives with his children is clearly invalid. In a bequest to an
adoptive parent, a condition that the adoption should be set aside
is likewise invalid.8 2  But suppose that the bequest is to the
children themselves and not to the parent. In a very recent
English case 8 3 the High Court upheld a clause in a will creating
a trust for certain infants which provided that no part of the
income of the trust fund should be paid or applied for the benefit
of any of the infant beneficiaries while in the custody or control
of their father, or while he should have anything to do with
their education or upbringing.8 4 But in another case a provision
in a gift to the testator's grandchildren that they should forfeit
their interest if they should live with or be or continue under
the guardianship or control of their father was held invalid. 5
This seems the preferable view; for although the tendency to
cause the parent to fail to perform his duty to the children may
conceivably not be as strong as where the bequest is to the parent
himself, yet it certaintly is not so slight as to be disregarded;
and, indeed, the desire of the parent to advance the worldly
prospects of his children has frequently a more compelling force
than 'his desire to promote his own welfare.
V. It is the policy of the state to encourage the establish-
ment as well as the preservation of the family relationship.
Hence a disposition of property may be illegal on the ground of
its tendency to restrain marriage. But a disposition the object
of which is to provide for a person as long as that person is
unmarried is not illegal, although it may offer something of an
inducement to remain single.86 A disposition of property which
"Anonymous, 8o N. Y. Misc. io.
3In re Borwick's Settlement, 115 L. T. R. 183.
84 Compare Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491; White's Estate, i63 Pa.
388.
'In re Sandbrook (1912), 2 Ch. 471. See In re Morgan, 26 T. L. R.
398; Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo. App. i69.
"Jones v. Jones, I Q. B. D. 279; Harlow v. Bailey, 189 Mass. 208.
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tends to impose only a reasonable restraint is not invalid.87 Thus
a provision that the estate shall be forfeited on a second mar-
riage, or on marriage under a certain reasonably low age, or on
marriage without the consent of a particular person is valid.
88
So also a provision tending to restrain marriage with a particular
person is not invalid. In a recent New York case 89 it appeared
that the testator was determined that his daughter should not
marry a particular man, and he provided that she should receive
the principal of a trust fund only when the man should die or
when she should marry some other man. She contended that
the provision was illegal, because it tended to restrain marriage,
and also because it tended to encourage her to kill the man. But
the court upheld the provision, for the restraint on marriage was
reasonable and the tendency to induce murder was slight.9 0 So,
too, the courts have upheld provisions tending to restrain mar-
riage with particular classes of persons, as, for example,
papists, 91 domestic servants,9 2 Scotchmen,9 3 persons other than
Jews 14 or Protestants 95 or Quakers.
9  Indeed, an Irish court 97
has upheld a condition divesting an estate on the marriage of
the legatee to a person in a "lower social position"; but it is to
be hoped that in this country such a condition would be held
void for uncertainty. If, however, the scope of the legatee's
choice is so limited that there is virtually a prohibition on mar-
riage, the provision is illegal. Thus a provision that a legatee
should lose her legacy on her marriage to any one but a Quaker
"?6 Gray, Cases on Property, 31 n.; Jarman, Wills, (6th Ed.), 1525-
1542; Halsbury, Laws of England, Vol. 28, tit. Wills, p. s86.
' But for obvious reasons the rule is otherwise where the person would
get the property if the beneficiary should marry without his consent. See
Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 333.
" Matter of Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77.
" Inasmuch as she engaged the man as her counsel in the case, she
certainly showed no sign of a desire to murder him.
'Duggan v. Kelly, io Ir. Eq. 295.
" Jenner v. Turner, 16 Ch. D. 188.
"Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East 170.
"Hodgson v. Halford, II Ch. D. 959.
"In re Knox's Goods, Ir. L. R. 23 Ch. D. 542.
"Haughton v. Haughton, I Moll. 611.
' Greene v. Kirkwood (1895), I I. R. 130.
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was held invalid in a case in which it appeared there were only
a half dozen marriageable Quakers within her reach. 8
VI. In England at one time many dispositions were invalid
as tending to encourage "the propagation of a false religion." 09
Although there have been numerous statutes relaxing the rigor
of the law as to Roman Catholics, Protestant Dissenters and
Jews, 00 trusts' for monastic orders are still illegal in England
and in Ireland.' There are still other remnants of the old
law of superstitious uses. In England a bequest for the saying
of masses is still held illegal as a superstitious use. 10 2  But in
Ireland 103 and in this country it is held that there is nothing
illegal in such a bequest.' 04 In other respects, however, the
attitude of the English courts toward religion has become
increasingly liberal. In 1850, a legacy to be applied as a prize
"for the best original essay on natural theology, treating it as a
science, and demonstrating the adequacy and sufficiency of nat-
ural theology when so treated and taught to constitute a true,
perfect and philosophical system of universal religion" 'failed on
the ground that it was not "consistent with Christianity." 105
This decision was expressly overruled in a recent case, in which
the Court of Appeal upheld a legacy to the Secular Society, Ltd., a
company the main object of which was "to promote in such ways
"Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r, ii Gratt. (Va.), 8o4. As there was
no gift over, the court held that the condition even if not invalid operated
only in terrorem. See also Story, Eq. Juris., Sec. 287.
'Rex v. Lady Portington, i Salk. 162.
"'Tudor, Charities (4th Ed.), 4-8.
"'Ellard v. Phelan (Igr4), i I. R. 76. But a trust for the members of
a monastic order is valid. It re Smith (914), I Ch. 937. So is a trust for
the decoration of its church. In re Greene (914), 1 I. R. 3o5.
' West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. & K. 684; Tudor, Charities (4th
Ed.), 44.
"'Reichenbach v. Quin, 21 L. R. I. 138; Attorney-General v. Hall (1897),
2 I. R. 426; O'Hanlon v. Logue (iqo6), I I. R. 247.
'" See Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462. On the question whether such
bequests fail, not on the ground, of illegality, but for the want of a definite
beneficiary, see ante, p. 538.
"Briggs v. Hartley, 19 L. J. (Ch.), 416. See also Cowan v. Milbourn,
L. R. 2 Ex. 230, where a contract to let rooms for the delivery of lec-
tures of a similar character was held illegal. In Thornton V_ Howe, 31
Beav. r4, a trust for "the printing, publishing and propagation of the
sacred writings of the late Joanna Southcote" was upheld because her
works contained "nothing which could shake the faith of Christians."
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as may from time to time be determined, the principle that
human conduct should be based upon natural knowledge and not
upon supernatural belief, and that human welfare in this world
is the proper end of all thought and action." 100 It was con-
tended that the purpose of the society was the promotion of
atheism and blasphemy. As to this the Master of the Rolls
observed that "this is one of the subjects in which there have
undoubtedly been great changes of opinion within the last hun-
dred years, and I think within the last half-century. It is really
a question of public policy, which varies from time to time."
The courts generally uphold conditions as to the benefi-
ciary's religious faith. No distinction is taken between the case
where the gift is conditioned upon adherence to an old faith
and the case where it is conditioned upon a change of faith. The
House of Lords has upheld a provision that if a devisee should
not be educated in the Protestant religion according to the rites
of the Church of England the property should go over to
another. 10 7  A provision divesting the interest of a legatee if
she should become a nun is valid.10 8  The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has upheld a condition that a legatee should withdraw
from the Roman Catholic priesthood and from membership in
any order or society connected with the Roman Catholic Church
or refrain from becoming a priest or forming such a connec-
tion.109 Another court has upheld a condition that the benefi-
ciary be educated in the Roman Catholic faith." 0 In another
case it was held that a gift may be conditioned upon the donee's
attendance upon "the regular meetings of worship of the Emanuel
Church near the village of Cashton, Wisconsin, when not sick
in bed, or prevented by accident or other unavoidable occur-
l°dIn re Bowman (I915), 2 Ch. 447. In Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465,
Sharswood, J., expressed the opinion that a legacy to the "Infidel Society in
Philadelphia . . . for the purpose of building a hall for the free discussion
of religion, politics, etc.", was illegal.
... Clavering v. Ellison, 7 H. L. C. 7o7.
"E. parte Dickson, i Sim. (N. S.), 37.
" Barnum v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275. See Kenyon v.
See, 94 N. Y. 563.
" Magee v. O'Neill, i9 S. C. 170. Compare McBride's Estate, 152
Pa. 192.
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rence." I" This condition, it was held, does not violate the
constitutional provision that "the right of every man to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience
shall never be infringed." The only decision the other way is
to be found in a Virginia case," 12 in which it was held that a
condition that a legatee should remain a member of the Society
of Friends is-against public policy as putting a premium upon
"fraud, meanness and hypocrisy," and as tending "to corrupt the
pure principles of religion." The objection to this view is that
it would raise too many and too difficult questions as to its limits;
and it is probably wiser to hold, s the courts generally have
held, that such conditions, foolish or whimsical as they may be
are not beyond the power of the testator to impose.
VII. One very definite limit set by public policy to the
power of the testator to control property after his death is the
time limit. This policy finds it chief expression in the rule
against perpetuities, of which the classic formulation is that of
Professor Gray: "No interest is good unless it must rest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at
the creation of the interest." 113 This rule is intended to prevent
a testator from designating the persons who shall enjoy his
bounty unto the third and fourth generation of those who come
after him. It relates only to the time of vesting of interests and
not to the time of their enjoyment, nor to their duration nor to
their assignability. It applies to equitable estates as well as to
.legal estates and to powers of appointment as well as to estates.
It is perhaps the most sweeping and the most important limita-
tion on the power to control property after death. But it is
questionable whether the period is not too long. The fact that
any, and any number of, lives may be selected, makes the possi-
ble period more than a century, if the testator is careful to choose
a sufficient number of lives of sufficiently youthful persons. In
several states, under the leadership of New York, the period has
by statute been shortened to two lives in being at the creation
1" In re Paulson's Will, 127 Wis. 612.
"Maddox v.Maddox's Adm'r, iI Gratt. (Va.), 804.
"' Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 201.
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of the estate."' The period was found in England to be too
long when the income as well as the principal is tied up; and a
shorter period for accumulation of income was therefore pro-
vided for by the Thellusson Act. 1 5 This statute has been par-
tially adopted in one or two of our states.4
1 6
And yet in spite of the rule against perpetuities, a testator
has power to create an interest which may not come into posses-
sion for centuries. There is no doubt that unless a statute pro-
vides otherwise, there is no limit to the possible duration of an
estate for years; and inasmuch as the remainder after an estate
for years is a vested interest, the rule against perpetuities does
not apply to it. 1 7  But undoubtedly long leases are a real evil
In a few states therefore statutes have been passed limiting the
duration of terms for years.".5 But in most of the states there
are no such statutes. There are other situations to which it is
held that the rule against perpetuities is not applicable, but which,
nevertheless, fall even more clearly within the evil which it is
the purpose of that rule to prevent. An estate in fee simple may
be created with a provision that on the happening of a certain
event the grantor or his heirs may put an end to the estate
granted; and the right of entry for breach of such a condition
is generally held not to fall within the rule against perpetuities."19
Again, it seems to be held in this country that one may create
an estate in fee simple to continue until the happening of a certain
event, and that such a determinable fee is valid in spite of the
Statute Quia Emptores, and, moreover, that the possibility of
reverter on the termination of such an estate does not fall within
the rule against perpetuities.120 Thus a provision in a deed of
'See Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Secs. 747-752.
"'39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (i8oo). This statute forbids accumulations
for any longer term than the life of the settlor, or twenty-one years from
the death of the settlor or testator, or during the minority of any person
who under the settlement or will would for the time being, if of full
age, be entitled to the income directed to be accumulated.
"'Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Secs. 715-727.
"'Gray, Rule, against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 972.
USGray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 21o, n.
"'Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Secs. 3o4-3iia. The rule
is otherwise in England. Op. cit., Secs. 299-303.
o Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Secs. 38-41a, 312.
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land to a railroad company that when the company should cease
to use the land for a station, the land should revert to the donor
or his heirs, has been upheld.12 ' But why should the grantor or
testator be allowed thus to create an interest which may terminate
at a very remote period, and thus to give his (in this country)
perhaps innumerable heirs 122 at some far distant date a right
to share his property? Surely such a result is opposed to sound
public policy.
There is another situation in which the testator is able to
affect the disposition of property long after he is dead. In the
case of In re Tyler,123 a testator bequeathed property to trustees
for a charity and provided that if the trustees should at any time
neglect to keep in repair the testator's family vault, the fund
bequeathed should pass to the trustees of a different charity.
This provision was held to be valid. Of course, no trust was
imposed or intended to be imposed on the fund bequeathed or
on any other property, but since the fund gave the trustees of
the first charity an income much greater than the expense of
keeping up the vault, those trustees would surely see to it that,
somehow or other, money would be raised to keep the vault in
repair and thus enable the charity to retain the fund bequeathed.
Now there could be no serious objection to this if the condition
were limited in its operation to the period of the rule against
perpetuities; but there was no such limitation. The difficulty
is in the holding that the rule against perpetuities has no appli-
cation to a gift over from one charity to another. 124 Now there
seems to be no good reason why the rule against perpetuities
should not apply to a gift over from one charity to another. 125
There is the most evident objection to allowing a gift over in
such a case as this, where the testator attempts to use the fear
'Carr v. Georgia R. R.. 74 Ga. 73. So also where the gift is to a
charitable corporation. First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171;
Pond v. Douglass, 1o6 Me. 85.
' Neither the right of entry for breach of condition nor the possi-
bility of reverter is assignable. See Pond v. Douglass, lo6 Me. 85.
(I8gi), 3 Ch. 252.
"' Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, i Mac. & G. 46o.
' Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), c. 18, especially Secs. 6o3f-
6o3h.
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of losing the property as a club perpetually impending to compel
the perpetual accomplishment of a non-charitable purpose.
126
VIII. There is another very important class of dispositions
of property which are contrary to public- policy, on the ground
that they take or tend to take property out of commerce.
While the owner of property may alienate it or not as he sees fit,
there is a policy which limits his power to transfer the property
to another and restrain that other from alienating it.1 27  The
law, therefore, invalidates a provision made by a testator or
donor in giving to another land in fee simple or an absolute
interest in personalty, that if the deirisee or legatee or donee
should attempt to transfer his interest, his interest shall termi-
nate.' 28 The practical effect of such provisions as these if upheld
would be to take the property out of commerce; for no one would
attempt to alienate if the penalty were loss of the property. So,
too, the law invalidates a provision that a fee simple or an
absolute interest shall terminate if the devisee or legatee or
donee should become bankrupt or if his creditors should attempt
"A gift for a non-charitable purpose where no beneficiary is designated,
if allowed at all, is invalid if it may continue for a longer period than
lives in being and twenty-one years. A direction for the saying of masses
during a period greater than that allowed by the rule against perpetuities
is, therefore, held invalid. Dillon v. Reilly, I. R. io Eq. 152; Re Zeagman,
37 Ont. L. Rep. 536. The result is different where a bequest for masses is
held to be a charitable bequest. A direction for the perpetual repair of a
tomb or vault is likewise held invalid. Mussett v. Bingle (1876), W. N. i7o;
Toole v. Hamilton (i9oi), r I. R. 383; In re Gay's Estate, 128 Cal. 552;'Mason
v. Bloomington Library Assn., 237 Ill. 442; Morristown Trust Co. v. Mayor,
82 N. J. Eq. 521; Godefroi, Trusts (4th Ed.), 203; Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d
Ed.), 2o, n. i. Compare Thomson v. Shakespeare, i DeG. F. & J. 399. The
result is different where by statute such bequests are considered as made for
a charitable purpose So, too, a direction that a band should be maintained to
play dirges and other appropriate music on the grave of the testator on each
recurring anniversary of his death, as well as on holidays and other proper
occasions, has been held to be invalid because not limited in its operation
to the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities. Detwiller v. Hart-
man, 37 N. J. Eq. 347. Compare Palethorp's Estate, 24 Pa. D. R. 215, in
which a testator bequeathed $i5o,ooo on trust to apply the income to the care
of his family burial lot and for the employment of a proper person to show
people the lot, was held invalid as to the latter provision.
1?The law seems to uphold a provision for the forfeiture even of
an estate in fee .simple or an absolute interest on alienation to certain
specified persons (Gray, Restraints on Alienation [2d Ed.], Secs. 31-44);
but the wisdom of upholding such provisions is doubtful.
"'The rule is the same although the restraint is for a limited time.
In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 8oi.
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to attach or levy upon his interest. There is a clear policy
against putting the property beyond the reach of creditors. But
if the interest given is only a life estate or an estate for years,
a provision forfeiting it on alienation, voluntary or involuntary,
is upheld. The difference between such provisions as to the fee
simple or absolute interest and those" as to life estates or estates
for years is a difference only of degree, but it is perhaps suffi-
cient to justify the difference in the law,129 for such limited
interests are not, like absolute interests, usual subjects of
commerce.
But, although a testator may thus lawfully provide that on
the alienation, voluntary or involuntary, of an interest for life
or years, the interest shall be forfeited, yet he cannot actually
prevent the alienation of a legal interest, whether absolute 13'
or for life or years. 31  In the case of an equitable interest,
whether absolute or for life or for years, the English view is the
same. ' 32 'But in this country there is a growing tendency to
allow restraints on alienation of an equitable life interest.3 3
But should not equity refuse to allow restraints on the aliena-
tion of equitable interests which as to legal interest are forbidden
by the law? Should not equity follow the law? Surely it should,
if the policy which forbids restraints on alienation of legal inter-
ests is applicable to equitable interests. Now obviously to make
the property itself inalienable would take the property out of
commerce. If an equitable interest in property is made inalien-
able, the physical property itself is not necessarily taken out of
commerce. The trustee who holds the legal title to the property
'Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d Ed.), Secs. 13-30, 78-90; Kales,
Future Interests in Illinois, Secs. 28f-285. It has been held that a pro-
vision for forfeiture on alienation of a life anpuity is valid. In re Demp-
ster (i915), i Ch. 795. "
J Tones v. Port Huron Engine Co., 171 Ill. 502; Clark v. Clark, 99 Md.
356; Lathrop v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6; Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66.3. Henderson v. Harness, 176 Ill. 3o2; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460.
"Brandon v. Robinson. I8 Ves. 429.
'"See Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.), 397-400; Gray, Restraints on
Alienation (2d Ed.), Secs. 134-277a. In some jurisdictions the creditors
of the beneficiary are excluded by statute from reaching the whole or a
part of his interest. Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.), 40n; Clark, Spend-
thrift Trusts in New York, 9 Bench & Bar, 6, 59, iO6; Perry, Trusts (6th
Ed.), 386, 8x5a.
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may or may not be given a right to sell it and to purchase other
property. If he is not given that right, ,the property itself is
taken out of commerce for all practical purposes, even though,
except as far as recording acts prevent, he may have the actual
power, by a breach of trust, to transfer the property free and
clear of the trust. If, on the other hand, the trustee has a right
to sell it, the property itself is not taken out of commerce; but
the beneficial interest in the property is taken out of commerce.
This is not as clearly against public policy as taking the property
itself out of commerce. But it seems that it does nevertheless
clearly violate a broader policy which forbids all restraints on
alienation. To give the "enjoyment of wealth without its respon-
sibilities," 134 by artificial means to keep wealth in the hands of
the dishonest or the incompetent, would seem opposed to the
principles of the sound economist and the wise sociologist. The
doctrine is a paternalistic doctrine, as Professor Gray says, but
it does not seem to be, as he suggests, a doctrine which, with its
tendency to perpetuation of the institution of private property
and of a separate plutocratic class, would commend itself to the
socialist. But the doctrine which allows these so-called "spend-
thrift trusts" is apparently a growing doctrine. Professor
Gray's powerful attack upon them has not been so much resisted
as ignored.' 35
It seems that in Massachusetts a testator may put an equita-
ble interest beyond the reach of attaching creditors and yet at
the same time allow the beneficiary to alienate it. 136 It may be
,suggested that to allow a voluntary alienation of an interest in
property and at the same time to prevent creditors from reaching
that interest is more clearly against public policy than to allow
a ,restriint on all alienation, both voluntary or involuntary. At
any rate, even if the testator may exclude attaching creditors
and yet may provide that the beneficiary may alienate his interest,
the question arises whether he can prevent the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the beneficiary from reaching the beneficiary's interest
"Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d Ed.), Sec. 168.
" One important exception is Hutchinson v. Maxwell, ioo Va. i69.
'1 Ames v. Clarke, io6 Mass. 573, semble; Huntress v. Allen, 195 Mass.
226, semble.
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where it is alienable. A negative answer to that question seems
easy. The Bankruptcy Act 137 expressly vests in the trustee all
"property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by
any means have transferred." That would seem exactly to cover
the case. But the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
recently held that the trustee in bankruptcy cannot reach the
beneficial interest even though the beneficiary might have
assigned it,'"" and the Supreme Court of the United States has
affirmed this decision.1
89
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the
Supreme Court of Illinois have recently gone so far as to uphold
restraints upon the alienation of an equitable interest in fee
simple or an absolute equitable interest.140  These cases are
opposed to the great weight of authority even in jurisdictions
which allow restraints upon equitable life estates. They seem to
be an unfortunate extension of the doctrine of spendthrift trusts,
though one with which the Massachusetts and the Illinois courts
have for some time been flirting.14
At any rate, if restraints on the alienation of equitable inter-
ests are to be allowed, a time limit must be put upon the power
of the testator to impose such restraints. The rule against per-
petuities governs only the time of vesting of estates and there-
fore does not apply. But, by analogy to that rule, the testator
can be prevented from restraining alienation beyond the period
allowed by that rule for the vesting of estates.'
42
... Sec. 7oa (5).
' Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Luke, 220 Mass. 484.
'" Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U. S. 427.
"o Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390; Wallace
v. Foxwell, 250 Ill. 616.
... Chiefly because of a failure to distinguish the doctrine of restraints
upon alienation as applied in Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass.
17o, with the doctrine of postponement of enjoyment as applied in Claflin
v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, which is considered hereafter. See Wagner v.
Wagner, 244 Il. Ioi; Lathrop v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6.
"In the case of restraints on the alienation of a future estate there
is a difference of opinion as to the time when the period should begin to
run. Professor Gray urges that it should begin to run on the commence-
ment of the estate. See Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec.
121 ii. Professor Kales urges that the period should begin to run on
the death of the testator. 20 Harv. L. Rev. 202.
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IX. Now as it is against public policy to prevent the owner
of property from alienating it, so also it is against public policy
to prevent the owner of property from enjoying it. Thus it is
said that "it seems if one grant his land to J. S. on condition
that he, being a husbandman, shall not sow his arable land, this
condition is void," because it is "against the public good"; 143
and again that "if a feoffment be made of land in fee on condi-
tion that the feoffee shall not enjoy the land or shall not take
the profits of the land . . . the condition is void as repugnant
to the estate."' 1 4 In a well-known case 145 a learned judge thus
clearly states the policy here involved:
"The owner of an estate may himself do many things which
he could not (by a condition) compel his successor to do. One
example is sufficient. He may leave his land uncultivated, but
he cannot by a condition compel his successor to do so. The law
does not interfere with the owner and compel him to cultivate
his land (though it be for the public good that land should be
cultivated), so far the law respects ownership; but when, by a
condition, he attempts to compel his successor to do what is
against the public good, the law steps in, and pronounces the con-
dition void, and allows the devisee to enjoy the estate free from
the condition."
A similar policy is applicable when a testator directs that
his property shall be destroyed or devoted to a purpose which is
purely capricious and by which no one is to benefit. In a Scotch
case, M'Caig v. University of Glasgow,'4 6 the court held invalid
a trust for the purpose of erecting and maintaining forever
artistic towers and monuments and statues of the testator and
the various members of his family on land devised by the tes-
tator. In the course of his opinion, Lord Kyllachy said: 147
"I consider that if it is not unlawful, it ought to be unlaw-
ful, to dedicate by testamentary disposition, for all time, or for a
length of time, the whole income of a large estate-real and per-
sonal-to objects of no utility, private or public, objects which
"Sheppard, Touchstone, 132.
. Sheppard, Touchstone, 131. -
" Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. C. 1, 144, per Pollock, C. B.
.. (i 907) S. C. 231.
"I Ibid., 242.
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benefit nobody, and which have no other purpose or use than that
of perpetuating at great cost, and in an absurd manner, the idio-
syncrasies of an eccentric testator. I doubt much whether -a be-
quest of that character is a lawful exercise of the testavnwti factio.
Indeed, I'suppose it would be hardly contended to be so if the
purposes, say of the trust here, were to be 'lightly varied, and
the trustees were, for instance, directed to lay the truster's estate
waste, and to keep it so; or to turn the income of the estate into
money, and throw the money yearly into the sea; or to expend
the income in annual or monthly funeral services in the testator's
memory; or to expend it in discharging from prominent points
upon the estate, salvoes of artillery upon the birthdays of the tes-
tator, and his brothers and sisters. Such purposes would hardly,
I think, he alleged to be consistent" with public policy; and I am
by no means satisfied that the purposes which we have here before
us are in a better position."
So where a testator devised a house to trustees and-directed
that the windows and doors should be kept bricked up for twenty
years, it was held that the next of kin of the testator could insist
on taking and enjoying the house during the twenty years.
1 48
So, too, in a case in which the testator bequeathed a favorite
clock to trustees with directions that it should be kept in repair
"so long as they might think it proper and practicable," but not
for the benefit of any one, the direction was held invalid.1 49 But
the law has been liberal to testators in the matter of funeral
expenses; and, a direction that $40,000 should be spent to erect
a monument to the testator's memory has been upheld.15 0
X. We have seen that a testator or grantor of property
cannot prevent the devisee, legatee or grantee from. alienating it,
or from enjoying it. May he validly postpone the enjoyment
of it? May he, in bequeathing the entire beneficial interest to a
person who is under no disability, validly provide that the prin-
cipal or even the income should not be paid to the legatee until a
certain date, or until the legatee reaches a certain age? Cer-
tainly the testator cannot accomplish such a result if he gives
the legatee the legal title to the property, for the legatee could
use it at once and no one could interpose an objection. And if
" Brown v. Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667 (1882), W. N. 134.
" Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 3o6.
"' Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. J. Eq. 347.
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he creates a trust with such a provision, but the trustee ignores
the provision and hands over the property to the beneficiary
before the arrival of the time designated, no one can object.
But may the beneficiary compel the trustee to hand over the
property before" the arrival of the time designated? 151 The
English view is that he cannot. 152  The reason sometimes given
is that the restriction is repugnant to the gift. If that means
that the disposition is self-contradictory or meaningless, it is not
true; the testator's meaning is perfectly clear, and perfectly con-
sistent. But does it mean that the disposition is against public
policy? The purpose of a spendthrift trust is the coddling of a
person as against himself and as against third persons. The
purpose of the postponement of enjoyment is simply the coddling
of a person against himself. Should his benefactor be allowed
so to coddle him? Mr. Gray felt strongly that he should not,
that to allow such a thing is to take a paternalistic attitude no
less obnoxious than that which upholds spendthrift trusts. The
opposite view, however, as embodied in the leading case of Claflin
v. Claflin,153 has met with some judicial favor. It has been said
that the worst that can be said of a disposition of this sort is
that it is harmless or unwise; that "the testator's harmless whim
ought to be allowed to prevail in the interest of supporting his
expressed intention"; and that the fact that it may sometimes
be an unwise provision is too trivial a ground to defeat the testa-
tor's intention.154  The argument against this is that there is a
policy against upholding a restriction on the enjoyment of prop-
erty by one who alone has a beneficial interest of any sort in the
'' If there are other persons who have vested or contingent interests
in the trust property a beneficiary cannot put an end to the trust by calling
for a conveyance of the legal title. Anderson v. Williams, 262 Il1. 308; I
Cornell Law Quarterly 209.
'= Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115.
149 Mass. 19. See for example the recent cases of Shelton v. King,
229 U. S. 9o; Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254. Even in jurisdictions where
Claflin v. Claflin is law, if circumstances have occurred which the testator
presumably did not contemplate, and which make a termination of the
trust expedient, the court may order such termination. Sears v. Choate,
146 Mass. 395; Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. r26; 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.), 43.
"' Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, Sec. 294.
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property, when neither the testator nor his heirs nor any one
other than the beneficial owner of the property can be in any
way benefited by upholding the restriction. 155 If such postpone-
ment of enjoyment is permitted, the duration of the postpone-
ment must be limited in time, The rule against perpetuities has
no application to this situation, for there is no question of vest-
ing of a future estate; but by analogy to that rule, enjoyment
should not be allowed to be postponed beyond lives in being and
twenty-one years.158
The doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin runs counter to another
class of cases. It is.held that there is a policy which invalidates
an attempt on the part of a testator to determine the form in
which the property shall be enjoyed by a legatee or devisee who
is given the entire beneficial interest in the property and who is
under no disability. Where, for instance, a testator directs that
land shall be sold and the proceeds paid to a certain person, that
person, if under no disability, may elect to take the land itself.'
This doctrine has been applied even in Massachusetts, the home
of the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin, and has been applied even
in a case where a testator has directed that a certain sum should
be invested in an annuity, where the question of the form of the
property is substantially a question of the time of enjoyment."5"
The Massachusetts court attempts to distinguish Claflin v. Claflin
on the ground that the beneficiary for whom the annuity was to
be bought was to receive the benefit of the whole fund. But that
was the situation also in Claflin v. Claflin. The court says that
since the annuitant might immediately sell his annuity, the pur-
chase would be a nugatory act. But in Claflin v. Claflin there
was no attempt to restrain alienation, and in most states such a
restraint on an absolute interest would be invalid anyway, and
therefore the beneficiary might have sold his interest and thus
"The incidental benefit to the trustee from the continuation of. the
trust is, of course, immaterial. He is not a beneficiary. Similarly an
agent has no right to insist on the continuance of the agency in order to
enable him to earn commissions.
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, Sec. 293.
... Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.), 459, n.
" Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 26o. See also Matter of Cole, 174 N. Y.
App. Div. 534.
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rendered nugatory the provisions for postponement of enjoy-
ment. Why should the intention of the testator be disregarded?
It is because an absolute gift has been made and neither the
testator nor any third person has any interest in the property,159
because no one has any standing to insist on the carrying out of
the wishes of the testator; because it is against public policy to
allow limitations on the control of property by one who alone
has any interest of any sort, vested or contingent, in that
property.
XI. Again, the testator is not allowed unrestricted power
to control the machinery of a trust which he has created. Prima
facie, whatever he authorizes the trustees to do, they are justified
in doing, and whatever he directs them to do, they are bound
to do, unless all the beneficiaries are under no disability and
excuse them from so doing. But this is not always true. A court
of equity may sometimes authorize the trustees to depart from
the testator's instructions. The trust is created for the beneficia-
ries, and it is their interests which should be considered. Thus
where the testator has directed that the trust property shall Ise
retained in a particular form, the court may authorize a sale and
reinvestment.:' A somewhat similar question is presented when
a testator names as trustee a person who is not fit to serve. Of
course, if the person named as trustee subsequently becomes unfit
to serve, the court may remove him. It is clearly proper also to
refuse to allow him to act, or to remove him, if he was unfit at
the time of his designation by the testator, but the testator was
not aware of his unfitness. In such cases as these such action is
in accordance with what would probably have been the wish of
the testator. But the courts have gone further. They have
sometimes refused to allow a trustee to act, although the ground
of his disqualification was known to the testator, who designated
1" If there is a contingent gift over of the annuity, the annuitant can-
not insist on taking the purchase price of the annuity or any part of it.
In re Dempster (1915), i Ch. 795.
'Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 2Ol; Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 64o. For
cases in which the court felt that the beneficiary's interest did not demand
a departure from the wishes of the testator, see Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472;
Johnson v. Buck, 220 I1. 226.
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him in spite of that fact. Thus where the trustee was directed
to pay to the beneficiary the income of the trust fund and any
part of the principal which in the trustee's judgment the benefi-
ciary might require for his support, and the trustee was given
the beneficial interest in 'all that might remain on the death of
the beneficiary, it was held that in spite of the testator's wish,
the conflict of interest and duty of the trustee was such that he
should not be allowed to act.161
Sometimes a testator leaves his property to his executors
or trustees and directs that a certain person shall be employed
by them as attorney or mariager of' in some other capacity in the
administration of the estate. Frequently he uses words which
can be construed, and which the courts are very ready to con-
strue, as precatory and not mandatory, as intended to express a
wish, but not to impose a legal obligation. In such cases, of
course, the person so designated cannot compel the executors or
trustees to employ him. 16 2 In otheir cases, although the testator
shows a clear intent to impose on his executors or.trustees a legal
obligation, yet the extent of the duties and of the right to com-
pensation are so indefinite that the intended obligation is void
for uncertainty, and so cannot be enforced. But the testator may
clearly show an intent to impose a legal obligation and the duties
and compensation may be definitely stated, or may be of such a
character that they can be made definite by resort to customary
usage. Has the designated person a right to compel the trustee to
employ him? Is it wise to allow a testator to restrict the exercise
of discretion by his executors or trustees in the administration of
the estate? It is submitted that to enforce such a provision would
be against public policy. The testator should not be allowed thus
to fetter the executors or trustees in their administration of the
estate and thus to clog the machinery, although he himself has
set it in motion. Surely a provision that the person designated
'Matter of Townsend, 73 N. Y. ivfisc. 481. Compare In re Morris, 27
Ch. D. 333.
" Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Cl. & F. 129 (agent to collect rents); Finden v.
Stephens, 2 Phil. 142 (manager of estate) ; Jewell v. Barnes' Adm'r, iiO Ky.
329 (business employee); In re Thistlethwaite, lO4 N. Y. Supp. 264 (at-
torney).
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should be employed, even though he prove dishonest or incom-
petent, is against public policy. And the same policy, .though not
so clearly, of course, would seem to forbid .taking away from the
executors or trustees the power of exercising their own discre-
tion in determining whom they should employ. 16 8
XII. Finally, it is held to be contrary to public policy to
allow the owner of property to create estates in that property
of a kind unknown to the law; he cannot, for instance, create a
legal or equitable estate in the grantee or devisee and his heirs
ex parte materna. He cannot exempt an estate, either legal or
equitable, from certain incidents which are attached by law to
the estate; he cannot, for instance, exclude the claim of the wife
of the grantee to dower.16 4  The one great exception to the
general rule is that which allows the creation of a married
woman's separate equitable estate; but even in the case of such
a separate estate the better view is that the creator of the estate
cannot exclude the husband's claim to curtesy. 65  He cannot
impose on his property new kinds of easements or other burdens
unknown to the law. 160 Courts of equity by upholding restrictive
covenants have gone further than the courts of law in allowing
the imposition of burdens on property.1 7  There are limits,
however, even in equity; for equity, in enforcing restrictive
covenants, follows the analogy of the legal doctrines as to ease-
ments.""' A covenant to do an affirmative act upon land will not
"Foster v. Elsley, i Ch. D. 518 (solicitor) ; In re Ogier, ioi Cal. 381
(attorney); Matter of Caldwell, i88 N. Y. ii5, 120 (attorney); In re
Wallach, 164 N. Y. App. Div. 6oo (attorney); In re Pickett's Will, 49
Ore. 127 (attorney); Young v. Alexander, 84 Tenn. io8 (attorney). But see
contra, Williams v. Corbet, 8 Sim. 349 (auditor of accounts); Hibbert v.
Hibbert, 3 Meriv. 68i (receiver of property); Consett v. Bell, i Y. & C.
Ch. 569 (receiver of property). The testator might, however, give a desig-
nated person an equitable interest in or charge on the fund for a certain
amount, and provide that that sum should be paid whether certain services
are performed or not, unless the trustees should request the performance
of the services, and the designated person refuse to perform.
'This, however, has been changed by statute in England. Dower Act
(i883).
" Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d Ed.), 383, n. 3.
'Ackroyd v. Smith, io C. B. 164 (right of way for purposes not con-
nected with any dominant estate) ; Hill v. Tupper, 2 H. & C. 121 (exclusive
right to use and let boats on a canal).16 Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774.
'" See the elaborate discussion in Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K 517.
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bind the land in equity, 169 nor will a covenant which is not for
the benefit of other land.' 70 Moreover, certain restrictions,
although they may be beneficial to some one, are contrary to pub-
lic policy, as when they tend to produce a monopoly or unduly to
restrain trade.' 71  Indeed in one case 172 the broad rule was laid
down that "a restriction on the use of real estate, when it does
not appear that either some individual or the public would be
benefited by it, would be contrary to public policy and void.' 73
CHARITIES.
To one who is ambitious of exercising by means of a dispo-
sition of his property the greatest and most enduring influence
on human affairs, charities offer the widest opportunity. By
means of a charitable trust a testator can create "an inalienable
indestructible interest." 17' There is no beneficiary to enforce
the trust except in rare cases,175 nor to consent to its destruction
or to the alienation of the trust property. The heirs or next of
kin of the testator have no standing to enforce the trust nor to
consent to its destruction or to the alienation of the trust prop-
erty.'16  The attorney-general may enforce the trust, but he
cannot destroy it nor authorize the alienation of the trust prop-
"Haywood v. Brunswick, etc., Society, 8 Q. B. D. 403; i Ames, Cases
on Equity Jurisdiction, 176.
"0 London County Council v. Allen (1914), 3 K. B. 642.
" Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36; Brewer v. Marshall,
ig N. J. Eq. 537; Tardy v. Creasy, 8i Va. 553. Compare, Whealkate Mining
Co. v. Mulari, 152 Mich. 607. But see, Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244;
i Ames, Cases on Equity Jurisdiction, 184. In the case of Norcross v.
James, r40 Mass. i88, a grantor conveyed a piece of land on which there was
a quarry, and which was bounded by another piece of land belonging to the
grantor; and the grantor covenanted for himself and his heirs and as-
signs that he would not open or work or allow any person to open or
work any quarry on this other land. A subsequent grantee of the quarry
brought a bill in equity to restrain a grantee of the other land from
quarrying stone on that land. The court dismissed the bill.
Mitchell v. Leavitt, 30 Conn. 587.
IT See also Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130. It is for a similar reason
that a court of equity refuses to enforce restrictive covenants when the
character of the property has so changed that there would be no sub-
stantial benefit to any one in enforcing them.
' Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 590.
' Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), App. A.
1.. Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. (Mass.), 328; MacKenzie v. Trustees,
67 N. J. Eq. 652, 677; Petition of Burnham, 74 N. H. 492.
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erty. A court of equity may, it is true, allow a change in the
form of trust property by ordering a sale or re-investment, 17
or, on the partial failure of the purpose of the trust, may apply
the doctrine of cy pres, or, on its total failure, impose a resulting
trust in favor of the heirs or next of kin of the testator.' 78  But
in this country, because of the constitutional prohibition of the
impairment of the obligation of contracts, neither the court nor
the legislature has any power to put an end to the trust if it is once
legally created and is possible of accomplishment.' 79  The prac-
tical effect, therefore, of a gift or devise or bequest for a char-
itable purpose is to make the beneficial interest inalienable and
to take it out of commerce. Hundreds of years after the creator
of a charitable trust has ceased from his labors, his works may
follow him. Undoubtedly there is a possibility of grave abuse
in thus allowing the establishment of perpetual charitable foun-
dations.'8 0 Undoubtedly the courts have sometimes not made
sufficient allowance for their growth and development. They
have been at times too prone to make nice inquiries as to the
precise expression of the thought and wish of the testator and
treated that as the sole test of what should be done with his
property, long after his death; instead of treating the thought
and wish of the testator as a starting point and considering the
natural development of his charitable purpose in the light of
changed and changing conditions. If a purpose is fit to be classed
as a charitable purpose, if it is fit to endure indefinitely, it surely
must be capable of growth and adaptation to new circum-
stances. But while we incline to be rigid on the judicial aspects
of charities, we are lax on the administrative side. In England
the charity commissioners are charged with the oversight of the
" Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 119; Old South Society v. Crocker, ii 9
Mass. 1, 26; 2 Perry, Trusts (6th Ed.), Sec. 737. Compare Female Orphan
Asylum v. Y. M. C. A., 1i1 La. 278. In England a sale or exchange of prop-
erty may be made with the consent of the charity commissioners, Lewin,
Trusts (12th Ed.), 634.
1 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 6o3i.
1 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 59o, n. See Craw-
ford v. Nies, 220 Mass. 61, 224 Mass. 474.
"'Congress for this reason refused to allow the creation. of a Federal
corporation to administer Mr. Rockefeller's millions.
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-administration of charitable foundations. Parliament has been
watchful to prevent fraudulent imposition on persons char-
itably inclined.' 8 ' In the United States there is generally no
supervision at all. The attorney-general does not act until some
one happens to set him in motion. A vast amount of wealth is
now administered in a haphazard way by charitable corporations
or trustees who are practically not responsible to any one.
Testators sometimes exhibit caprice and sometimes even
spite in the creation of charitable foundations. The generous
Girard in founding his college provided that no "ecclesiastic,
missionary or minister of any sect .whatsoever" should ever hold
or exercise any station or duty in the college, or be admitted
even as a visitor within the premises; and this provision was
upheld. 18 2 But there are limits to the effect that will be given
to the caprice of the founder. In a bequest for the establishment
of a public school a testator directed that for a term of one hun-
dred years the descendants of nine designated persons should be
excluded from the school. This direction was held invalid as op-
posed to public policy, though the other provision as to the estab-
lishment of the school were upheld.'8 3 It is peculiarly essential
in the case of charitable trusts, which may endure forever, that
the founder's caprice should not be given too free a rein. Dispo-
sitions, though for educational or religious or public purposes, or
for the relief of the poor, which are altogether whimsical or
capricious, should not be regarded as charitable dispositions.
And if the general purpose of the testator is such as to be called
charitable, yet capricious or whimsical provisions as to the carry-
ing out of the charitable purpose should not be allowed to
stand. The courts may do much to curb the testator's whims in
the case of charitable trusts which they cannot do in the case of
strictly private trusts.
Testators perhaps of small means but charitably inclined
who are anxious to make their property go a long way sometimes
provide that the sum bequeathed by them shall be invested and
... See War Charities Act (i9i6), 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 43.
" Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (U. S.), I27, 197.
Nourse v. Merriam, 8 Cush. (Mass.) ii.
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that the income shall accumulate for a certain time or until it
reaches a certain sum, and that the original fund and the accumu-
lations shall then be used for a designated charitable purpose.
The House of Lords has held that such a direction for accumula-
tion is invalid and that the income is immediately available for
the purposes of the charity..8 4  The reason for its invalidity is
the same as that which forbids postponement of enjoyment in
the case of a trust for an individual. In jurisdictions where the
doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin is recognized, such a direction is
held to be not necessarily invalid, even though the accumulation
is to last longer than the period of the rule against perpetuities.
And yet even in these jurisdictions the evil of postponing the
enjoyment of property for too long a time is recognized, and it
is held that in each particular case it must be determined whether,
under all the circumstances, the provision for accumulation is
so unwise as to be opposed to public policy.' 85
In speaking of bequests for charitable purposes, Lord Camp-
bell once utttered these words of warning:
"A man has a natural right to enjoy his property during his
life, and to leave it to his children at his death, but the liberty to
determine how property shall be enjoyed in saecula saeculoruin when
he, who was once the owner of it, is in his grave, and to destine it in
perpetuity to any purposes however fantastical, useless, or ludicrous,
so that they cannot be said to be directly contrary to religion and
morality, is a right and liberty which, I think, cannot be claimed by.
any natural or Divine law, and which I think, ought by human law
to be strictly watched and regulated."' 8
SUMMARY.
In no branch of our law has its individualistic character
been more strikingly exhibited than in that relating to testa-
mentary disposition. The right of the owner of property to
dispose of it as he chooses has long been strongly emphasized.
"8 Wharton v. Masterman (1895), A. C. 186.
... Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513; Girard Trust
Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 ; Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125; St. Paul's
Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188; Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass.
33; Collector of Taxes v. Oldfield, 219 Mass. 374; Oldfield v. Attorney-
General, 219 Mass. 378; Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), Sec. 679a.
' Jeffries v. Alexander, 8 H. L. C. 594, 648.
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Clius est dare, ejus est disponere, is a maxim which has often
fallen from the lips of the judges. The possession and control
of property gives a man a mighty instrument for influencing for
good or ill the world about him. A man should never be allowed
to wield that instrument without control. But if in an uncon-
trolled right of private ownership there lurk many dangers
threatening the welfare of. society, much more do such dangers
lurk in an uncontrolled power of testamentary disposition. It is
bad enough when the power conferred by the possession of prop-
erty is exercised by a living man who is wicked or foolish; it is
worse if it is exercised by the wicked or foolish dead; the living
are at least open to the influence of the world about them; the
dead are beyond our reach. Great as has been the freedom of
testamentary disposition allowed by our law, public policy has
always set limits to it; to set such limits is not opposed to the
spirit of our law. Public policy may be an unruly horse,ls but
it is one the judges have to ride. The fact that it is difficult to
draw the line between dispositions which are merely unwise and
those which are opposed to public policy does not excuse the courts
from attempting to draw the line. We have seen that a disposi-
tion is opposed to public policy and therefore illegal when it tends
to cause the commission of crimes; when it tends to interfere
with the functions of the state; when it tends to promote immor-
ality; when it tends to cause the disruption of families or to
prevent the establishment of the family relationship; when it
attempts to tie up property for too long a time; when it attempts
to render property inalienable; when it attempts to separate
from the absolute ownership of property the right to enjoy it,
and to enjoy it at once; when it attempts too minutely and
unwisely to regulate the details of the management of property;
and when it attempts to attach to property new and strange
incidents. In these various cases the attempted disposition is
against public policy either, first, because the property is used as
an instrument to compel or induce the doing of acts which are
in themselves against public policy, or, second, because posterity
is deprived of the benefit of the property. It is clearly against
s"Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252.
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public policy to allow property to be used as a club to compel or
induce the doing of acts which are against public policy. It is
also clearly against public policy to allow the owner of property
at the moment that he looses his hold upon it to make provisions
which will deprive the world of the benefit of that property;
while he still owns the property he may use it as foolishly as he
likes, provided he does not interfere with the rights of other
persons; he may if he chooses sow his land with salt; it is thought
that self-interest will act as a sufficient curb to restrain an owner
from doing such things; but there is no such curb when he dis-
poses of his property; and here the law must step in and prevent
him from depriving others of the benefits of ownership.
(Concluded.)
Austin Wakeman Scott.
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